Publications
(forthcoming) "Cartesian Know-How", (with Rodrigo Gonzalez), Southern Journal of Philosophy.
In this paper, we examine the prospect of extracting an account of know-how from Descartes’ philosophy. Against the traditional take, we argue that Descartes views on know-how cannot be simply reduced to his account of theoretical knowledge. The key to understanding Descartes on know-how is to examine his accounts of moral certainty and the relation between the mind and the body in action.
(2024) "Calibrating and Bootstrapping Modal Judgment", Disputatio, XV, 69, 250-266. [url]
In this paper, I consider the question of whether calibration is required for modalizing mechanisms to be reliable, that is, whether it is necessary for modalizing mechanisms to be adjusted to prevent overgeneration and undergeneration of modal beliefs. I first argue that the calibration requirement affects differently what I call bootstrapping and ordinary cases. Identifying different ways in which a modalizing mechanism could be calibrated, I argue that not all of them are effective or even viable in bootstrapping cases. Then, by taking a diachronic perspective, I offer a simplified account of how different calibration mechanisms can be bootstrapped, with an emphasis on the social dimension of modal judgment.
(2024) "On the possession and attribution problems for collective know-how", Aufklärung, 11, n. Especial Nov. 2024, 87-102. [url]
In this paper, I examine two issues that any account of know-how, but particularly an account of group know-how, needs to deal with: the possession problem, which is the need to explain how a group can be in a state of knowing how to do something, and the attribution problem, which is the need to account for the conditions in which it is admissible to attribute know-how to a group. I argue that (despite some initial appearances) they are independent problems, which is specially important in the context of theories where know-how cannot in general be reduced to proposition-oriented attitudes.
(2024) "Modalizing in Musical Performance", (with Giulia Lorenzi), Mind & Language. [url]
This paper aims to connect issues in the epistemology of modality with issues in the philosophy of music, exploring how modalizing takes place in the context of musical performance. On the basis of studies of jazz improvisation and of classical music, it is shown that considerations about what is sonically, musically, and agentively possible play an important role for performers in the Western tonal tradition. We give a more systematic sketch of how a modal epistemology for musical performance could be constructed. We argue that it is necessary to adopt a pluralist approach towards the modal epistemology of music.
(2024) "Going Ballistic: the Dynamics of the Imagination and the Issue of Intentionalism", Philosophy and the Mind Sciences. [url]
Do we have control over the content of our imaginings? More precisely: do we have control over what our imaginings are about? Intentionalists say yes. Until recently, intentionalism could be taken as the received view. Recently, authors like Munro & Strohminger (2021) have developed some arguments against it. Here, I tentatively join their ranks and develop a new way to think about the way in which imaginings develop their contents that also goes against intentionalism. My proposal makes use of what we may call a ballistic framework for mental dynamics, which I sketch to some length. In this model, imaginings are articulated by ballistic events sensitive to constraints that modify the trajectories that imaginings trace in a special working space. This framework leaves room for alternatives to pre- assigned-content models, such as Kung’s (2016). In the ballistic-based models sketched here, and against intentionalism, imaginings can fail to be about what we intend them to be about. The framework also has applications beyond the intentionalism debate, some of which I will sketch.
(2023) "¿Quién sabe cómo? Re-examinando las atribuciones de know-how en contexto", Palabra y Razón, 24, 15-32 [url]
The debate between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists about know-how rages on. Kevin Wallbridge (2021) has argued that certain patterns of know-how attribution can be explained by a contextualist intellectualist theory (subject-specific intellectualism). In this paper, I examine Wallbridge’s proposal and argue that anti-intellectualists can also explain the data by appealing to the role of context in the attribution of ability.
(2023) "Concepts of Knowability", (as co-author with Jan Heylen), Revista de Humanidades de Valparaiso, 23, 287-308 [url]
Many philosophical discussions hinge on the concept of knowability. For example, there is a blooming literature on the so-called paradox of knowability. How to understand this notion, however? In this paper, we examine several approaches to the notion: the naive approach to take knowability as the possibility to know, the counterfactual approach endorsed by Edgington (1985) and Schlöder (2019), approaches based on the notion of a capacity or ability to know (Fara 2010, Humphreys 2011), and finally, approaches that make use of the resources of dynamic epistemic logic (van Benthem 2004, Holliday 2017).
(2023) "Compressing Graphs: A Model for the Content of Understanding", Erkenntnis, doi: 10.1007/s10670-023-00694-3 [url] [pdf]
In this paper, I sketch a new model for the format of the content of understanding states, Compressible Graph Maximalism (CGM). In this model, the format of the content of understanding is graphical, and compressible. It thus combines ideas from approaches that stress the link between understanding and holistic structure (like Grimm's (2016)), and approaches that emphasize the connection between understanding and compression (like Wilkenfeld's (2018)). I argue that the combination of these ideas has several attractive features, and I defend the idea against some challenges.
(2022) "Towards Subject Matters for Counterpossibles", Studia Semiotyczne, 35(2), 125-152 [url] [pdf]
In this paper, I raise the problem of dealing with counterpossible conditionals for theories of subject matter. I argue that existing accounts of subject matter need to be revised and extended to be able to a) provide reasonable (potentially non-degenerate) verdicts about what counterpossibles are about, b) explain the intuition that counterpossibles are in some sense about what would happen if the antecedent were true, and c) explain in what sense counterpossibles can be about individuals. I sketch how one could extend atom-based and way-based theories of subject matters to handle the problem. Then, I raise the problem that it might be desirable for a theory of subject matter to prevent the inference that certain counterpossibles are about the kinds of things that they seem to mention.
(2021) "On Understanding People, Structure, Desires, and Ourselves", Cinta de Moebio, 72, 183-193 [url] [pdf]
Stephen Grimm defends the idea that for understanding people, we need to think of understanding not only in terms of grasp of structure (be that causal or of other kinds) but also in terms of a notion of understanding-as-taking-to-be-good. In this paper, I critically examine this idea. First, I argue that in some cases, understanding-as-taking-to-be-good can be explained in terms of understanding-as-grasp-of-structure. Then, I consider one further way in which understanding-as-taking-to-be-good could be obtained through something which is not a form of grasp of structure, which narrows and refines Grimm’s understanding-as-taking-to-be-good concept.
(2021) "Understanding Attributions: Problems, Options, and a Proposal", Theoria, 88, 558–583. doi: 10.1111/theo.12380 [url] [pdf]
In this paper, I give an overview of different models of understanding attribution, and advance a contextualist account of understanding attribution. While other contextualist accounts make the degree in which the epistemic states of the relevant agents satisfy certain invariant conditions context-sensitive, the proposed account makes the conditions themselves context-sensitive.
(2020) "Game Counterpossibles", Argumenta, 6(1), 117-133. doi: 10.150pt75/2465-2334/202011.mor [url] [pdf]
Counterpossibles, counterfactuals conditional with impossible antecedents, are notoriously contested; while the standard view makes them trivially true, some authors argue that they can be non-trivially true. In this paper, I examine the use of counterfactuals in the context of games, and argue that there is a case to be made for their non-triviality in a restricted sense. In particular, I examine the case of retro problems in chess, where it can happen that one is tasked with evaluating counterfactuals about illegal positions. If we understand illegality as a type of restricted impossibility, those counterfactuals are non-trivial counterpossibles. I suggest that their non-triviality stems from their role in practices of rule coordination and revision, and suggest that this model could be generalized to counterpossibles in different domains. I then compare the approach to the accounts of Vetter 2016 and Locke 2019.
(2020) "Epistemic Projects, Indispensability and the Structure of Modal Thought", Res Philosophica, 97(4), 611–638, doi: 10.11612/resphil.1946 [url] [pdf]
I argue that modal epistemology should pay more attention to questions about the structure and function of modal thought. We can treat these questions from synchronic and diachronic angles. From a synchronic perspective, I consider whether a general argument for the epistemic support of modal though can be made on the basis of modal thoughs’s indispensability for what Enoch and Schechter (2008) call rationally required epistemic projects. After formulating the argument, I defend it from various objections. I also examine the possibility of considering the indispensability of modal thought in terms of its components. Finally, I argue that we also need to approach these issues from a diachronic perspective, and I sketch how to approach this task.
(2019) "Mistakes as Revealing and as Manifestations of Competence", Synthese, doi: 10.1007/s11229-019-02281-y [url] [pdf]
The final chapter of Elgin’s (True enough, The MIT Press, Cambridge, 2017) defends the claim that some mistakes mark significant epistemic achievements. Here, I extend Elgin’s analysis of the informativeness of mistakes for epistemic policing. I also examine the type of theory of competence that Elgin’s view requires, and suggest some directions in which this can be taken.
Manuscripts
Some odds and ends.
"Reseña: Axel Barceló Aspeitia. Falibilidad y Normatividad. Un Análisis Filosófico de la Suerte.". [pdf]
A review in spanish of Axel Barceló Aspeitia's book *Falibilidad y Normatividad*.
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"Imagined, Supposed, and Impossible Ways: A Dialogue". [pdf]
A Socratic dialogue, where the Sea and Herself wonder how to make a paper crane and find themselves debating the nature of ways. The Sea defends that ways are possibilities, whereas Herself suggests that there can also be impossible ways.
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"One More Against Finding the Source of Modal Spaces". [pdf]
In this paper, I examine the question of the source of modal spaces. I identify two ways in which we could approach the question: internally and externally. I argue that internal approaches have to avoid the worry of vicious circularity, but that it will be hard for any account to satisfy this requirement. Introducing the notion of a modal profile, I show that many candidate explanatory bases may already be modally-profiled in a way that would make explanations invoking them circular. I examine the possibility that the circularity in these cases may not be vicious, but dismiss it. I then argue that external approaches might not do much better.
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Postdoctoral Project:
Saber Cómo: Preguntas, Maneras e Intentos
2022-2025. Universidad de Chile.
PhD Thesis:
Agentive Modality and the Structure of Modal Knowledge
2017-2021. KU Leuven.
This thesis develops a theory about the structure of modal judgment and knowledge. Arguing in favor of pluralism about the source of modal knowledge, it focuses on the questions of the varieties of modal judgement and their relations, the function of modal judgement and the scope of modal knowledge. It offers a hypothesis about the development of the framework of modal knowledge, grounding it on the capacity to evaluate temporal judgements, from which the capacity to evaluate alternatives comes from. It suggests that the most basic framework of modal judgements consists in that of agentive modality, and in particular, about what one can do, and how. It is argued that the rest of the framework of modal judgement can be developed on this basis, although this imposes certain restrictions about the scope of modal knowledge. Additionally, the thesis provides analyses of various agentive modal notions, such as imaginability, what is a way to do something, and discusses how to understand counterfactuals with impossible antecedents.